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T he Gulf War created one of the largest single man-made disasters in history, oil fires greater in number than all previous well fires added together, and 
slicks more than two to three times the size of the world's previously largest oil spill. 
Damage to the coastal and desert ecology of southern Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi 
Arabia-from the fires and spills, from military fortifications and land mines, from 
attacks on oil and petrochemical installations, and then from intense operations by 
two of the largest tank armies ever assembled-produced widespread destruction and 
disrupted a fragile balance. Routine movements and encampments produced solid 
waste on a huge scale. Oil fires produced historically unequaled emissions of 
hydrocarbons. An otherwise vibrant and fertile Euphrates River valley was damaged 
by a breakdown of irrigation and agricultural systems, and continues to deteriorate 
due to ongoing Iraqi ecocide practices in response to insurgency.l 
Environmental damage provoked a torrent of speeches, legal briefs and journal 
articles, conferences and meetings; intense lobbying by environmental and 
humanitarian organizations; was the subject of proposals for a "Fifth" Geneva 
Convention and other new protections; was discussed extensively in the Sixth 
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in 1991 and 1992; deliberated 
by an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Experts Group; on the 
agenda at the United Nations Council for Economic Development (UNCED); 
considered in the U.S. Government's review ofIraqi war crimes; and included in 
the Pentagon's final report to Congress on conduct of the war. "Data" about the 
oil spills and fires even has its own place on the Internet. 
On the surface, all the huffing and puffing has produced little. Before the war, 
the Bush Administration in National Security Directive 54 (NSD-54) designated 
destruction of Kuwait's oil resources as one of three "unconscionable acts" (along 
with the use of chemical and biological weapons and acts of international 
terrorism) for which the Iraqi leadership would be held personally responsible. 
President Bush's eleventh hour letter to Saddam Hussein forcefully threatened a 
"terrible price" in retaliation.2 
Governments such as Jordan were early doomsayers about the environmental 
threat, agitating strongly for action after the war. But politics intruded and they 
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subsequently retreated, not wanting to condemn their resilient and powerful 
neighbor. Nor did Kuwait or Saudi Arabia formally "charge" Iraq. Neither wanted 
to further fan the flames, nor potentially open up their own half-hearted clean-up 
efforts and environmental practices to greater outside scrutiny. 
Yet war crimes have not been pursued and since Operation Desert Storm, U.S. 
Government lawyers (and those of most other developed nations) have argued that 
the problem is neither scope nor shortcomings in international law but compliance 
and enforcement of existing law.3 International "political-strategic" 
considerations thus take priority over protection of the environment. In this 
regard, it could be said that advances of the last two decades in environmental 
accountability have been superseded by a version of "supreme national interest." 
Which is to say, if a credible scenario for reverberating environmental destruction 
on a global scale could be postulated, then likely the conduct of warfare would take 
precedence over the potential widespread harm. 
The environmental calamity and lack offormallegal action in the Gulf War 
may thus seem an odd context in which to claim that environmental protection 
has advanced, yet the true story of the war is one of a high degree of sensitivity to 
environmental destruction by both sides, and at least by one, significant 
self-imposed constraints, many corresponding to the very restrictions that 
Coalition government lawyers eschew. The environmental issue was "used" by 
both sides in a cynical way, but public visibility of the environmental dimension 
of warfare was also highly influential. Though Iraq's destruction went unpunished, 
if there is a silver lining, it is that it and other environmentally destructive practices 
that Pentagon lawyers otherwise condone have essentially become "outlawed" in 
common practice. 
For the American side, much of the history regarding political constraints on 
air power and ground operations remains shrouded in secrecy. The reason seems 
obvious: Government lawyers and military planners have little interest in seeing 
public expectations codified as new combat doctrine, policy, or law. 
I remember having an argument with a military lawyer in 1992 as to whether 
the U.S. Marine Corps even used napalm in the air war. The lawyer asserted that 
they did not, and I told him that I had Marine Corps documents specifying how 
many and by which airplanes. His denial is instructive about the real impact 
environmental and humanitarian considerations have on US military operations. 
Though napalm is not an "illegal" weapons per se, its employment for particular 
purposes probably no longer is possible without provoking negative publicity. So 
public announcements of its use are suppressed, even denied. 
Napalm was "tried" as a weapon in the Gulf War, as were fuel air explosives, 
mostly to aid in the breach ofIraqi defenses and to overcome minefields and fire 
trenches. For these purposes, the weapons did not make much of an impression, 
and their value to commanders in comparison with other weapons did not exceed 
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the potential public outcry that might have resulted from their use, particularly 
as anti-personnel weapons (even against enemy soldiers). 
The use of napalm is just one example of where the gap between 
political/public-relations constraints and "legal" constraints seems to be growing. 
The result can be strange justification for the "need" to bomb targets that are 
otherwise politically stigmatized. Take dams for instance. Though legitimate 
targets,4 because of their potential for unleashing enormously destructive forces 
on the civilian population, they acquired political sensitivity through the Korean 
and Vietnam wars, so much so that their attack is generally restricted even in U.S. 
military doctrine.5 
The bombing of Iraqi dams was suggested early on as a punitive measure, 
potentially in response to the use of chemical weapons, but was rejected.6 No 
prohibitions per se against hitting hydroelectric power stations collocated at dams 
were incorporated into Operation Desert Storm rules of engagement. 
Nevertheless, military lawyers argued that in such attacks, dams and dikes would 
have to be avoided "for humanitarian/political reasons." Little more arose on the 
subject until after the war. Then the same lawyers counseled that dams and dikes 
should be bombed in future conflicts, less the option to bomb them be lost in some 
legal prohibition that merely follows common practice? 
The cases of napalm and dams are instructive. For regardless of official 
"legality," there are a set of weapons and targets that now seem to be particularly 
"controversial," receiving a disproportionate degree of attention in the news 
media, and within the humanitarian community. Weapons include napalm, fuel 
air explosives, depleted uranium, cluster bombs, anti-personnel mines, riot control 
agents, incendiaries, and blinding lasers. Targets that have acquired negative 
repute, mostly because of adverse human or environmental effects, include water, 
dams, nuclear power plants, electrical power, oil and petrochemical facilities, as 
well as other civilian utilities. 
It is important to establish from the beginning that the environment does not 
just mean trees, or birds, or water. It is the natural surroundings that support 
human life. Within the intricacies of international law and practice, 
environmental protection is increasingly and inextricably a part of human rights 
law: "It is now recognized that personal growth and happiness-fundamental 
human rights-cannot be achieved in a severely damaged environment."s 
Some theorists in the military-prophets of "information" or "parallel" 
warfare-assert military benefit behind the reverberating impact of destruction of 
interconnected systems. Yet loss of electricity (or computer networks) is not just 
relevant for its speculative second- or third-order potential to disable air defenses 
and command and control. The first order effect on water purification and 
distribution, and the resulting environmental and direct harm to human health, 
is of greater consequence. 
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In this paper, I examine more closely three environmental issues which bear 
upon the conflict between the ethic of protection and military necessity. In the 
case of oil fires and spills, I argue that the lack ofinternational action to hold Iraq 
responsible weakens the existing standards of protection. I argue that the reason 
for lack of action on the part of the United States is that responsibility for the oil 
damages proved more complicated than the popular charge of "environmental 
terror" suggested. In the case of destruction of electricity, I argue that the concept 
of "collateral damage" needs to be expanded, given the ability of military 
technology to limit direct but not indirect effects of destruction on systems 
indispensable for the survival of the civilian population. I then look at the set of 
stigmatized weapons and speculate that their reputation is born not just of 
particular cruelty or suffering, but because of a sense of their "toxicity" and 
long-term damage. The emotional debate regarding the "Gulf War syndrome" 
should prove instructive with regards to the many unknowns and risks that lurk 
behind new technology. In fact, the public conscience seems a finer gauge of the 
"legality" or "desirability" of new weapons than does the formal review process 
undertaken by Pentagon lawyers. 
Spills, Fires, and Dilution of International Law 
Environmental damage in the Gulf War occurred both as a result of acts of 
deliberate destruction and malice, and as an unintentional byproduct of military 
activity. The vast majority of the fires and spills were the result ofIraqi sabotage 
of Kuwait's oil industry. But Coalition military action contributed.9 
In December 1990, Iraqi engineers detonated six oil wells and ignited basins of 
oil in Kuwait, practicing procedures for the subsequent larger scale destruction. 
Iraq then packed wellheads with plastic explosives, linking them together with 
electrical and mechanical detonators. On 21 January, less than a week after the . 
start of the air war, 60 wells in and around Al Wafrah in southern Kuwait were 
exploded. At about the same time, refineries and storage tanks at Mina ash 
Shuaybah and Mina Abd Allah, on the coast south of Kuwait City, were also set 
ablaze. On the eve of the ground war, on or about 22 February, Iraq started to 
d.etonate the remaining wellheads, the majority centered in the Al Burgan oil field 
south of the Kuwait International Airport. 
In all, Iraq destroyed 732 wells,10 20 oil and gas gathering stations,l1 and 
damaged four refineries,12 as well as downstream oil facilities such as gathering 
manifolds, tank farms, pipelines, and ofiloading facilities. Two of four natural gas 
booster stations were also damaged. Of the 732 sabotaged wells, 650 were set aflame, 
and 82 were damaged sufficiently to cause them to gush oil uncontrollably.B 
Fires, as well as large amounts of oil exposed to the natural environment, created 
noxious gases and massive amounts of inhalable particles. At the height of the 
fires, the amount of soot emitted was estimated at 5000 tons per day, the equivalent 
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of 46 million heavy-duty diesel trucks, roughly nine times the number in the 
United States, driving at 30 miles per hour. 14 The last well fire was extinguished 
on 6 November 1991. But that is not the end of the story. 
What really happened in the rapidly moving and confusing war? On the first 
morning of the air war, U.S. Navy planes bombed an Iraqi oil platform and loading 
terminal in the northern Gulf at Mina Al Bakr, evidently creating the first oil slick. 
On the seventh day of the air war (23 January), U.S. Navy aircraft struck the Iraqi 
tanker Amuriyah while underway in the northern Gulf, as it was refueling a 
Winchester class air-cushioned landing craft. The resulting secondary explosions 
destroyed the tanker. That same day, anAl Qadisiyah-class tanker moored on the 
coast of Kuwait was also destroyed by French aircraft. Two days later, two oil slicks 
were reported in the Gulf, one in the vicinity of where theAmuriyah was sunk, and 
the other at the Sea Island terminal off the coast of Kuwait. Intelligence analysts 
believed the second slick had been started by Iraq, and oil from the terminal 
quickly extended down the coast of Saudi Arabia. 
On 25 January, U.S. Navy units engaged an Iraqi mine-laying vessel near the 
Sea Island terminal, setting a part of the terminal and surrounding water afire. 
Another oil slick was identified further north on the Kuwait coast on 26 January. 
It was evidently the result of Coalition bombing of the Ras al Qulayah naval base 
and surrounding facilities. Oil continued to leak from the Mina Al Bakr terminal 
and theAmuriyah tanker nearby. On 27 January, U.S. Navy aircraft engaged two 
additional tankers riding high in the water northeast of the Bubiyan Island 
channel. Both tankers were struck and one was later reported aground and leaking 
oil on the north bank of the Khorr Abd Allah. A pipe on the southern tip of 
Bubiyan Island, originating in the Rawdatayn oil field in northern Kuwait, was 
also observed leaking oil, evidently from Coalition bombing. The tanker Hittin 
was reported on fire at the Mina Al Ahmadi north pier on 28 January. On 2 
February, intelligence observers reported that a slick emanating from the northern 
Gulfwas growing larger; origin unknown. 
I go through this somewhat confusing and highly abbreviated chronology 
because the official story looks very different. What the public heard during the war 
was that around 19 January, Iraq opened valves at the Sea Island terminal, pumping 
oil directly into the Gulf: Soon after the start of allied military action, moored Iraqi 
tankers south of Kuwait City also supposedly began discharging oil into the Gulf: 
There is no mention of their being bombed, or of other tankers being targeted. The 
Saudi oil storage facility and refinery at Al Khafji, just south of the Kuwaiti border, 
was shelled by Iraqi artillery, and it began to leak oil. Saudi oil platforms were 
damaged by drifting Iraqi sea mines. Later, Iraqi tankers anchored northeast of 
Bubiyan Island also began expelling oil, but again no mention of the attacks by 
Coalition aircraft. Damaged Kuwaiti refineries and oil tanks along the coast are not 
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revealed. Many of these were the objects of aircraft bombing and intense naval 
gunfire. The combined spill was eventually, estimated at 7-9 million barrels. 
The considerable fallout from the oil-fire smoke plume immediately effected 
public health, and ultimately damaged significant land and water areas. Because 
the plume remained between 1500 and 13,000 feet, and was never detected above 
18,000 feet, the global spread in the upper atmosphere was minimized. 
Nevertheless, smoke had a regional climatic effect-area surface temperatures 
were below normal by as much as 10 degrees Fahrenheit in 1991. There was a 
decline in agricultural productivity in the region, as well as increased animal 
mortalities due to ingestion of oil-tainted vegetation. Oil continued to leak into 
the Gulf from a number of sources until late Mayor early June, adding as much 
as one-half million barrels beyond the end of the war. Eventually, oil fouled 400 
miles of Saudi coastline, inundating salt marshes and tidal areas with oil, and 
killing marine life and diving birds. 
There is little evidence that Coalition attacks on tankers or oil targets balanced 
military necessity against whatever environmental damage might occur. But the 
bombing of tankers was an internally controversial matter. Indeed, while some 
planners and commanders outside the Navy argued that tankers were off limits, 
the top Navy commander argued that they were as legitimate as electrical power 
or other civilian utilities. IS 
In the end, Iraqi environmental destruction dwarfed the various U.S. 
contributions, but war crimes were not pursued for various forensic reasons, and the 
full story of the destruction of oil could not be told for fear of implicating the United 
States. Pentagon lawyers asserted that the 1977 Environmental Modification 
Convention (the ENMOD Convention),16 and 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva ConventionsI7 ''were not legally applicable in the Persian GulfWar.,,18 What 
is more, they concluded that even had Additional Protocol I been in force, the damage 
would not have applied because it did not reach the required legal threshold.19 The 
U.S. Government even stated in its environmental report to Congress that Iraqi 
actions "were probably done to slow or prohibit an amphibious landing of Coalition 
forces in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,,,20 thus giving credence to future justifications of 
environmental destruction as having military purpose. However, as all the evidence 
shows, the Iraqi actions were acts of pure destruction where the military implications 
were secondary or even inadvertent. The Iraqis knew that they were destroying the 
environment. Indeed, there is evidence to indicate that they thought that their actions 
would have an even greater impact. 
Destruction of Electricity and Redefining Collateral Damage 
Before the Gulf War, destruction of electrical power production in warfare had 
been pursued with varying effects yet with identical results: The nullification of 
electrical energy was a minor, if not inconsequential, incumbrance to military 
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operations. Though some argue that the Gulf War was a significant departure 
from previous experiences, the military impact seems to be no different than 
World War II, Korea, or Vietnam. Sufficient damage was done to the national 
grid to essentially cause a nationwide blackout within a week of the U.N. 
deadline, but military capabilities powered by central electrical grids were also 
the object of intense direct attack and they were degraded mostly because of 
that direct bombing, not because they lost power. Coalition electronic warfare 
and countermeasures efforts, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) 
directed against modern electronic accoutrements of war were also 
unprecedented in their scope and intensity, further diminishing the unique 
and circumscribed impact ("non-lethal") of destroying electrical power.21 
Though the destruction of electricity was pursued honestly as a means to effect 
Iraq's air defenses and command, control, communications, and intelligence 
(C3I), and may have helped to paralyze Iraqi armed forces, the civilian impact 
outweighed the military benefit. 
Iraqi electricity was largely cut throughout the country starting from the first 
night of the war (17 January) and production did not resume until the late 
March-April time frame. Iraqi officials state that allied bombing knocked out 7S 
percent of the country's electrical generating plants. Unanticipated by air 
planners,22 the civilian life-support system was brought to a halt, and everything 
from heating and air conditioning;' to water supply, purification and sewage 
treatment; to medical care was interrupted. In March 1991, United Nations envoy 
Martii Ahtisaari reported on the civilian effects of electrical bombing: 
The role of energy in Iraq is especially important because of the level of its 
urbanization (approximately 72 per cent of the population lives in towns and cities), 
its industrialization, and its prolonged, very hot summers. 
Ahtisaari's U.N. field mission found that, "all previously viable sources offuel 
and power (apart from a limited number of mobile generators) ... are now, 
essentially, defunct .... Additionally, there is much less than the minimum fuel 
required to provide the energy needed for movement or transportation, irrigation, 
or power generators to pump water and sewage." Iraq's biggest recovery problem 
in the post-war period was the destruction of its energy and power resources-lOan 
omnipresent obstacle to the success of even a short-term, massive effort to 
maintain life-sustaining conditions in each area of humanitarian need.1023 "Iraq in 
recent years had become a high-tech society dependent on electric power generation 
for irrigation, medical services, communications and industry," another early field 
report concluded.24 
Electrical bombing proved one of the most controversial aspects of Gulf War 
bombing,25 and the Defense Department, in its Final Report to Congress on the 
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Conduct of the Gulf War, explained the purpose and reasoning behind the attacks. 
The destruction of electricity, it said, 
had a cascading effect, reducing or eliminating the reliable supply of electricity 
needed to power NBC weapons production facilities, as well as other war-supporting 
industries; to refrigerate bio-toxins and some CW agents; to power the computer 
systems required to integrate the air defense network; to pump fuel and oil from 
storage facilities into trucks, tanks, and aircraft; to operate reinforced doors at aircraft 
storage and maintenance facilities; and to provide the lighting and power for 
maintenance, planning, repairs, and the loading of bombs and explosive agents. This 
increased Iraqi use ofless reliable backup power generators which, generally, are slow 
to come on line, and provide less power. Taken together, the synergistic effect of 
losing primary electrical power sources in the first days of the war helped reduce 
Iraq's ability to respond to Coalition attacks. The early disruption of electrical power 
undoubtedly helped keep Coalition casualties low.26 
It was a laundry list of potential and postulated effects, but not a report of 
observed or provable impact. 
From the beginning, the military recognized the intimate connection between 
destruction of electricity and the livelihood of the civilian population. "Because 
of our interest in making sure that civilians did not suffer unduly," General 
Norman Schwarzkopf stated on 30 January, "we felt we had to leave some of the 
electrical power in effect, and we've done that.,,27 
Air war planners made attempts to limit the overall impact of shutting down the 
electrical system on the civilian population, focusing targeting on distribution as 
opposed to generation subsystems, and limiting the amount of destruction at harder 
to repair generating facilities. Because of confusion in the target guidance and the 
normal fog of war, the limitations were not followed. In addition, planners were 
wrong in their assumption of rapid u.s. or international intervention because of 
Iraq's defeat to repair the utility. The effect on the civilian population was 
unprecedented. 
The Gulf War Air Power Survey CGWAPS) concluded that nullification of 
electrical power was achieved with "remarkably little collateral damage.,,28 
Collateral damage, here defmed as incidental and unintended civilian casualties 
sustained in the course of attacks, was indeed extremely low. Ignored, however, is 
the far more injurious secondary collateral damage caused by accurate attacks. The 
air war spared Iraqis from the indiscriminate effects of urban bombing, yet 
efficiently disabled society's support systems, with the attendant short- and 
long-term impact. Civilian harm was compounded by the fact that civilians were 
otherwise spared the direct effects of bombing in the highly discriminate 
"strategic" bombing campaign. The result magnified the electrical effect. 
Electricity is so important to modern societies that attacks that could have 
severe effects on the noncombatant population should be prohibited. The U.S. 
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government accepts as customary law, as codified in Additional Protocol I, the 
prohibition on the deliberate starvation of civilians, and the intentional 
destruction of food, crops, livestock, and other objects indispensable to their 
survival. The U.S. also does not object to Article 54 of Additional Protocol I which 
protects "drinking water installations.,,29 
But these restriction do not extend to destruction of installations that could 
result in identical secondary effects. Thus, the destruction of dual-purpose power 
grids are not restricted from attack. The ICRC list of categories of objectives of 
"generally recognized military importance" created in 1956 included: 
installations providing energy mainly for national defense ... plants producing gas 
or electricity mainly for military consumption.30 
The U.S. defended the right to attack integrated power grids as legitimate 
targets throughout the negotiation of the Additional Protocols.31 U.S. negotiator 
Ambassador George Aldrich noted that "of course we knew about power grids and 
of course we were not going to agree to a provision that prohibited attacks on key 
elements of power grids." Aldrich says attacks are allowed on power 
stations-including nuclear reactors-that service central grids because the grid 
itself is an example of "regular, significant and direct support of military 
operations" as defined under Additional Protocol 1.32 
Yet proof of "definite military advantage" required by the customary law 
defmition of Article 52 of Additional Protocol I is difficult. Writing recently in 
The Journal of Strategic Studies, a former "Checkmate" Gulf War planner concludes 
that while the destruction of the Iraqi electric grid 
almost certainly had a significant impact on several key Iraqi subsystems, the 
specifics are still unknown. Until we get much greater access to Iraqi officials and 
documents we will not know how badly the loss of the electric grid hurt the Iraqi C3 
network, its NBC research and development complex, or air defense system.33 
The author argues in the forthcoming "Power Failure: Destruction of 
Electricity in the Gulf War," based upon extensive research in Iraq, that in fact 
destruction of electricity had negligible military advantage for the United States. 
Indeed, destruction of any target must also be shown not to be "excessive" in 
relation to whatever military advantage is being sought. Destruction of civilian 
electrical power generation is thus a violation of the prohibitions in customary 
international law against "any military operation which is not directed against a 
legitimate military target or which can be expected to cause incidental death, 
injury or damage to civilians that is clearly excessive in relation to the direct 
military advantage of the operation.,,34 
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Toxicity on the Battlefield 
The Gulf War witnessed the most extensive and widespread use of submunitions 
in the history of conflict, the first combat use of depleted uranium weapons, and 
large-scale mining both on land and at sea. The result was a significantly increased 
explosive ordnance disposal and battlefield remnants problem.35 Ironically, while 
Iraqi use of mines and the land mine problem has received the majority of attention, 
cluster bombs were far more injurious and damaging, and depleted uranium far more 
emotionally and symbolically important. 
Cluster bombs and land mines (often called "grenades" in ground-delivered 
weapons and "bomblets" in air-delivered weapons)36 are nothing new, and they 
hardly received the attention in the Gulf War reserved for smart weapons. Most 
people are even unaware of what submunitions are, let alone that they constituted 
a quarter of the weapons dropped by aircraft. Some 61,000 were expended, totaling 
some 20 million bomblets (Table 1).37 
Table 1 
Air-delivered Cluster Bomb Expenditure in the Gulf War 
~ Efflli Numb!:[ EXll!:od!:d 
United States Air Force Navy Marines 
CBU-52/58/71 Frag 21,696" 
° ° CBU-59 APAM 
° ° 
186 
CBU-78 Gator 
° 
148 61 
CBU-87 CEM 10,035 
° ° CBU-89 Gator 1,105 
° ° Mk20 Rockeye AA 5,345 6,814 16,014 
£uhImal 38,181 6,962 16,261 61,404 
Allied RAF 
BL-755 8 
CBU-87 387 
£uhImal 395 
ThIal 61,799b 
AA: anti-armor with poor fragmentation and incendiary capability; APAM; anti-personnel! 
anti-materiel; CEM: Combined effects munitions (light anti-armor and anti-personnel); 
Frag: incendiary/fragmentation bomblet with no anti-armor effect; Gator: air-delivered 
magnetically fused heavy anti-tank and tripwire anti-personnel mines. 
• Sources vary on the number ofCBU-52158nl cluster bombs expended, some stating 
17,831. The higher official number was chosen; see GW APS, Vol. III, Part I, at 234 & 256. 
b Does not include a complete count of allied use of cluster bombs, particularly French 
and Saudi. The BL-755 is a British-manufactured cluster bomb. 
Sources: U.S. Department of the Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey (GW APS), 
Volume III, Part I, p. 235, Volume IV, Part I, p. 65, Volume V, Part I, pp. 550-552; 
House of Commons, Preliminary Lessons o/Operation Granby Guly 1991), p. 86. 
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Modern submunition weapons consist of two main types-those delivered by 
aircraft, and those by surface artillery or rockets.38 Weapons carrying 
submunitions disperse them over a large area, thereby increasing the impact area 
of an attack. The large number delivered in a dispenser increases the density of 
explosives in a target area, with submunitions designed to strike every few feet or 
so. An artillery or rocket barrage, or an air attack, typically can disperse thousands 
of submunitions within a small space, a common target area in planning roughly 
being an area lOOx50 meters. Obviously, an attractive feature for militaries is that 
the submunitions are inexpensive given the area of destructive potential in 
comparison with unitary explosives. 
Even though weapons are being designed to be more and more "reliable," because 
submunitions are used in such large numbers, "reliability" as it relates to unexploded 
ordnance and environmental damage on the battlefield (and in civilian locations when 
cluster bombs are chosen for an urban attack) has actually declined (within the context 
of otherwise discriminate attacks). As the use of smaller and smaller munitions 
increases, more and more numbers are expended in battle. The large number of 
weapons, individually less expensive, intentionally more expendable and simply 
designed, creates more of a lingering problem. Small, inexpensive electronic fuses are 
more prone to malfunction under severe conditions. 
In the Gulf War, cluster bombs delivered from medium and high altitudes 
experienced "excessively high dud rates.,,39 Despite contact fuses and secondary 
firing systems, an enormous number failed to detonate, particularly when landing 
in soft sand and shallow water or mud. Ground-delivered (e.g., artillery or rocket) 
submunitions also experienced high dud rates. Estimates vary from the 
conservative 2-5 percent claimed by manufacturers, to up to 23 percent observed 
in acceptance and operational tests, to an average onO-30 percent observed on the 
ground after the war in Iraq and Kuwait.40 Even a conservative five percent 
estimate means that some 2.2 million unexploded bomblets were left behind, 
almost half from air-delivered bombs. 
With the proliferation of remotely delivered sub munitions, both air and ground 
delivered, emplacement of mines by the individual soldier is increasingly a less 
important theater operation in high technology warfare. Air-delivered cluster 
bombs and scatterable artillery-, helicopter-, or rocket-delivered submunitions 
will predominate in the future. There are a number of implications from this 
"advancement:" placement is by necessity more random, more driven by 
short-term considerations on the battlefield given the flexibility of the weapon. 
Well over one million anti-tank, anti-personnel, and sea mines were emplaced 
by Iraq in the Gulf War. In terms of clean up, the difference between cluster bombs 
and mines is that grossly insufficient procedures and requirements exist to recover 
unexploded bomblets scattering the battlefield. With ground- and air-delivered 
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submunitions, there are no restrictions and the very nature of the weapons often 
defies precise mapping of their expenditure. 
During the Cold War, the military was less concerned about submunition 
placement and dud rates because weapons were developed to defend against a 
Soviet offensive in Western Europe, one which would not have required U.S. 
soldiers to occupy "submunition-contaminated" areas.41 With the large scale use 
of sub munitions in a rapidly moving offensive battlefield, such as the Gulf War, 
however, friendly hazards were immediately felt. One government study 
concluded that during Operation Desert Storm at least 25 U.S. military personnel 
were killed and others were injured by submunitions fired by their own forces.42 
Troops with the U.S. 1st Armored Division, for example, said that the principal 
threat they faced was "unexploded ordnance believed to have been left over 
from ... earlier American bombardment.,,43 The situation was so critical that 
large scale use of cluster bombs by aircraft was restricted during the ground war 
for fear of friendly casualties44 and, in some instances, "ground movement came 
to a halt because units were afraid of encountering unexploded ordnance.,,45 
In the immediate aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, unexploded 
submunitions killed or injured more than 100 soldiers and military explosive 
disposal specialists.46 Post-war injuries to U.S. soldiers from unexploded ordnance 
on the battlefield, particularly because of the excessive "dud rate" of 
ground-launched submunitions, became so serious that Congress requested that 
the General Accounting Office (GAO) investigate manufacturing, purchasing and 
handling.47 
The military effectiveness of submunitions varies, but it far from clear that 
either ground- or air-delivered submunitions, or land mines, have advantages that 
outweigh the human and environmental impact. Aerial cluster bombs proved 
ineffective in the armor attack role during the Gulf War, and with the emergence 
of a wide variety of precision anti-tank weapons, they seem less and less attractive 
weapons for such attacks in the future (particularly where U.S. forces have to 
operate). Use of cluster bombs against urban targets, given the constraints of 
restricting collateral damage and civilian effects, seems counterproductive. 
Indeed, cluster bombs used in strategic bombing attacks proved a bit of a nuisance. 
Given their properties of small explosions and broad dispersal, they greatly 
complicated battle damage assessment as the noticeable impact on stationary 
targets (as opposed to larger explosives of 500-2,000 pound class) was difficult to 
assess via reconnaissance. 
There are circumstances in which the use of cluster bombs might be beneficial 
in terms oflimiting collateral and reverberating damage. In the Vietnam War, for 
instance, cluster bombs were used to attack anti-aircraft artillery guns that had 
been placed on embankments and dikes in the north. The guns could be 
suppressed without doing harm to the irrigation and water control structures. 
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The large scale use ofIraqi mines also proved more of a nuisance than a decisive 
military instrument. Mines, in order to be effective against modern forces, need 
to be maintained and protected by covering fire, and are therefore not as attractive 
for large scale use by sophisticated militaries as are submunitions. In fact, the new 
generation of scatterable mines (delivered from artillery, aircraft and ground 
dispensers) which entered arsenals in the 1980's will likely replace hand-sown 
mines in the future. These can be mass emplaced in mobile or tactical settings, 
and employ influence sensors and electronic timers. 
When submunitions and mines are evaluated for their military effect in many 
missions-particularly given the emergence and success of smart weapons-or 
when their use is measured against the collateral effects, they are far less attractive. 
The effects are immediate and measurable. In the case of depleted uranium (DU) 
as an anti-tank weapon, the effects are more subtle. 
Depleted uranium is used in armor penetrators, both in bullets shot from 
aircraft (and ship-based gattling guns) and in tank ammunition.48 Because of 
uranium's density and physical properties, it is attractive as an alternative to 
tungsten or other more expensive metals. In the Gulf War, about 14,000 DU tank 
rounds were consumed (4000 fired in combat) and 940,254 30mm DU bullets were 
fired by A-10 aircraft.49 The health and environmental risks remain unclear; the 
U.S. Army itself states that there is a "n~ed for more data on potential health and 
environmental consequences associated with the chemical and radiological 
characteristics ofDU."sO A January 1993 GAO report found thattheArmy did not 
have a comprehensive DU battlefield management plan.S1 
As a result of medical screening at the end of the war, some 35 soldiers were 
found to have traces of uranium in their urine. ApPi'oximately 22 soldiers may 
have retained embedded DU fragments. Early in reporting on the so-called "Gulf 
War syndrome," DU was identified as a possible contributing factor to the 
unexplained illnesses being reported by veterans (and was the subject of 
considerable Iraqi propaganda).s2 Though no one now believes that DU is 
ultimately causal, the Army admits that the long-term health effects have not been 
well defined,S3 and the proliferation of DU weapons to other nations will 
undoubtedly increase whatever risks do exist. 
The latest thinking on the "Gulf War syndrome," in fact, is that a syndrome as 
such does not exist. A comprehensive U.S. Department of Defense surveyoflO,OOO 
veterans and family members found no link to biological or chemical weapons, 
environmental pollutants, hazardous chemicals, depleted uranium, oil well fires, 
vaccines, or diseases unique to the desert. Undoubtedly, at least amongst the 
veterans groups and a segment of the population, Gulf War syndrome will join 
missing in actions (MIAs) in Southeast Asia or even UFO's as grand "cover-ups" 
of the government. Yet it is the long list of potential or even suspected toxins that 
is interesting. Far more work is needed to understand the emergence of new 
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technologies or the interaction of certain substances uniquely found on the 
battlefield in terms of the human and natural environmental impact. 
Though environmental "modification" has been a subject of discussion for 
many years, newer technologies may actually be increasing the attractiveness of 
use of the environment for warfare. Despite U.S. denials, enough documentation 
exists to indicate that the Iraqi-perpetrated oil conflagration and the creation of 
significant amounts of smoke had a significant impact on U.S. air operations, Iraqi 
intentions or not. Laser-guided bombs and other sensor-dependent weapons (e.g., 
television, electro-optical, and infrared) are severely constrained by atmospheric 
conditions. In the Gulf War, many laser-guided weapons were unable to acquire 
targets because of adverse weather conditions (i.e., rain and fog), and optical guided 
weapons were definitely constrained by the smoke of oil fires. The conditions were 
both natural and man-made. For instance, smoke pots were used to obscure targets 
and had an effect on target acquisition and bombing. 
In addition, night vision devices are dependent on a certain environmental 
condition. That is, it has to be dark. In the Gulf War, oil well and trench fires, 
even fires caused by routine bombing, caused havoc with night-vision devices. The 
combined effect was obscuring nearly all natural ambient light, which night-vision 
devices need for illumination. By contrast, too much light causes a sort of 
"blooming" effect.54 Perhaps in the face of night attacks, a future countermeasure 
would be the large scale creation of certain types of illuminations that would not 
expose friendly forces. 
As "smart" weapons become more commonplace, perhaps the countermeasures 
to smart weapons guidance systems-including modifying atmospheric 
conditions55 -will be an important part of a nation's defense. Thus the 
weapons/counter-weapons battle, coupled with more discriminate precision 
weapons and urban bombing constraints, as well as new concepts of information 
("systemic") warfare, could serve to make the potential for devastation or 
disablement of civilian systems, with inadvertent environmental damage, even 
worse in the future. 
It may be important to reaffirm the original intent of the ENMOD 
Convention,56 to strengthen the disarmament effect in the face of advances in 
military technology, as well as to more rigorously define environmental damage 
that might (or should be) applicable. Yet advances in military technology were not 
even discussed at the 1993 ENMOD Convention review conference.57 
Legal Protections for Environmental Destroyers? 
A number of international agreements have been developed over the years with 
the very goal oflimiting damage to the environment during war. Until the 1970s, 
treaties relating to the conduct of war focused on humans and their property. 
Provisions of the laws of war dealing with military necessity and proportionality 
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related to the environment, but then attitudes began to change and environmental 
consequences began to be questioned as something other than the otherwise 
inevitable accompaniment of military action. 
Though armed conflict is always a tragedy for the environment, in the Gulf 
War, there was a perception prior to Operation Desert Storm that the venue for 
war, and the intensity of modern weapons, would mean that the war would be more 
environmentally destructive. But since global calamity did not occur, and the war's 
end was not defined, the environment was made subordinate to the political needs 
of the victorious States. 
Some would think that the environmental destruction that did occur might 
serve as a catalyst to bring the various agreements, laws, and proposals under 
review. But this has so far not been the case. There has been a lot of procedural 
wrangling, yet with the snuffing out of the last oil fire, and the shift of television's 
gaze away from the Gulf, interest in any real change also was extinguished. 
In civil society, a nation is now, in theory, to be held responsible for the 
environmental damage it causes. But we have not yet arrived at the point of any 
punishment for actions during warfare, let alone any clarity as to the illegality of 
the acts perpetrated. Over the years, a lack of enforcement against Iraqi use of 
chemical weapons and other grave breaches may have signalled to the Ba'athist 
Government that "international law" is a matter for posturing and propaganda, 
and not action.58 When napalm or others weapons are used experimentally or 
cynically as examples to avoid restrictions in international humanitarian law, 
similarly the message to other nations is that the secrecy surrounding them and 
their use might be proof of their worth, as well as signs of American duplicity in 
its compliance with international law. 
The destruction of Kuwait's oil resources and Iraq's electrical production were 
both done intentionally, both with precision. The juxtaposition of the two is 
merely to illustrate that one is clearly "illegal" and the other is not. The massive 
oil spills and oil fires polluted air, land, and water, threatening fisheries, ocean 
ecology, and public health. The bombing of electricity started a cascade of misery 
for the Iraqi civilian population, severely affecting irrigation, water treatment, 
sanitation, and agriculture. The boundary between "property damage" as specified 
in the law of war and natural (e.g., environmental) damage is increasingly thin. 
Most in the humanitarian and environmental community have argued that the 
scale of the oil spills and fires constitutes a breach of international law. However, 
to focus solely on scale leaves unresolved the main issue of contention between the 
military establishment and the humanitarian community, the presumption of 
military necessity. Regardless of scope, there is no evidence that the performance 
of Iraqi military forces was degraded by the loss of electricity. This is not to say 
that there was no effect, it is just that it is difficult to assert that a calculation of 
the destruction of the civilian utility can be shown to have "definite military 
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advantage." Despite numerous annoyances, the oil spills and fires also did not 
create any definable military advantage for Iraq. 
None of this is to set up a counter-legal analysis. The codified law is useful to 
set the parameters that might constrain military operations to improve protections 
for the civilian population and the environment. Yet it is the political and public 
opinion constraints that are much more important in terms of cutting edge 
technologies or new situations. On close examination, the record of the Gulf War 
shows that when military leaders or Washington decision makers restricted 
destruction, they did so largely to avoid adverse public opinion, not because 
technicalities in the law were the issues of concern. 
Greater awareness of environmental "stewardship" and pollution prevention 
by soldiers and commanders has created an obvious ethos of responsibility for 
long-term effects of operations, and a receptiveness to limitations. 59 There is no 
doubt that the very nature of modern society-urbanized, industrialized, 
increasingly dependent on electrically-driven amenities-makes it more 
vulnerable to disruptions. "A strategic center of gravity for most States beyond the 
agrarian stage is the power generation system," Colonel John A. Warden, the air 
war principal designer, wrote after Operation Desert Storm. "Without electrical 
power, production of civil and military goods, distribution of food and other 
essentials, civil and military communications, and life in general becomes difficult 
lO impossible. Unless the stakes in the war are very high, most States will make 
desired concessions when their power generation system is put under sufficient 
pressure or actually destroyed.,,60 
The Gulf War thus should portend the kind of damage we might see in the 
future. Mass destruction weapons did not kill masses, precision weapons did. The 
successful and precise destruction of intended targets had a devastating effect on 
the civilian population, one more reminiscent of bombing associated with 
old-style urban attacks and not a squeaky clean smart war. Environmental calamity 
on a global scale seems to have been avoided, but the very efficiency of harm, and 
the lingering impact of such a short conflict, should portend the potential for war's 
greater potential for destructiveness. 
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